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Abstract
A key requirement of democratic governance is that policy outcomes and the majority pref-
erence of the electorate are congruent. Many studies argue that the more direct democratic
a system is, the more often voters get what they want, but the empirical evidence is mixed.
This analysis explores the democratic effect of initiatives and referendums theoretically and
empirically. The prediction of the formal model is that “bad” representation (i.e., a large
preference deviation between the electorate and the political elite) is good for the democratic
effect of direct democracy. An empirical investigation of original voter and elite survey data,
analyzed with multilevel modeling and post-stratification, supports this argument. Build-
ing on the literature, the findings of the analysis suggest that the extent to which direct
democratic institutions are conducive for policy congruence—and may thus be advisable as
democratic correctives to representative systems—depends on the political conflict structure.
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“I assume that a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness
of the government to the preferences of its citizens” (Dahl, 1971, 1).
1 Introduction
A core element of a democracy is the alignment of legislative and government actions with
voters’ preferences. The normative idea that public policies should reflect the majority will of
the electorate, what we define as policy congruence, is as a general democratic principle hardly
contested. Two literatures approach the study of policy congruence from different angles. First,
representation scholars argue that the overlap between the preferences of the electorate and
those of the political elite is the key driver of policy congruence (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Golder
and Stramski, 2010). Second, the literature on direct democracy argues that referendums and
initiatives are conducive for policy congruence because voters are supposed to get what they
want when they can participate in policy making (Gerber, 1996; Matsusaka, 2010). However, the
empirical evidence on the positive effect of direct democratic institutions on policy congruence is
mixed (Lax and Phillips, 2012). For understanding the conditions under which direct democratic
institutions are conducive for policy congruence, this analysis focuses on the policy preferences
of the electorate and the political elite.
To that end, we provide a formal and empirical analysis. The formal model predicts that
the more the preferences of the political elite and the electorate deviate from one another,
the larger is the positive effect of initiatives and referendums on policy congruence. Thus, in
contrast to the argument of the representation literature, “bad” representation is conducive
for the direct democratic effect on policy congruence. Why is that? In essence, initiatives
and referendums are powerful democratic correctives when the political elite has clear signals
that the voters hold deviating preferences. For the empirical investigation of that argument,
we analyze the variation in direct democratic institutions among Swiss cantons (which are in
many other dimensions comparable polities). To derive preference measures, we conducted two
surveys asking cantonal politicians and voters whether they support a total of 10 tax, health-
care, education, and family policies. With this data and fine-grained census information, we
estimate elite and voter preference measures, as well as the deviations between the two, using
multilevel modeling and post-stratification (Gelman and Little, 1997; Park et al., 2004).
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This study makes a substantial contribution to the literature on direct democracy by pro-
viding an empirical investigation that relies on consistent measures of policy congruence and
accurate estimates of the preferences of the electorate and the political elite over various policy
areas. The findings of the empirical analysis support the theoretical prediction that, in direct
democratic systems, a large deviation between the preferences of the political elite and the voters
is good for policy congruence, not bad, as the representation literature suggests. In a nutshell,
direct democratic institutions have no effect on policy congruence when the electorate’s and the
elites’ preferences are aligned; when they deviate, however, referendums and initiatives exert a
positive effect on policy congruence, and the conducive effect grows as the elite-voter preference
deviation becomes larger. The core substantive contribution of the analysis is that we show
how the conducive effect of direct democracy on policy congruence depends on the elite-voter
preference deviation, which may, at least partly, explain the mixed empirical findings of the
literature.
Last but not least, we discuss the institutional implications of our findings by exploring the
political conflict structures under which direct democratic institutions can fully exploit their
potential for increasing policy congruence. Our analysis builds on the insights of the representa-
tion and the direct democracy literatures, which suggest that competitive and fair elections are
powerful in minimizing the elite-voter preference gap on the main political conflict dimension,
while direct democratic institutions allow the unbundling of issues and are thus effective demo-
cratic correctives for policy questions on second-ordered dimensions (Besley and Coate, 2008).
Accordingly, in a polity with a one-dimensional policy space (e.g., the United States), the con-
ducive effect of direct democracy should be limited because it only matters for the rare policy
questions that are not on the main conflict dimension. However, in systems with multiple con-
flict dimensions, where, for example, the political conflict on cultural policy questions is clearly
distinct from the main left-right conflict dimension (e.g., many European countries), we expect
strong positive effects, because initiatives and referendums can democratically accommodate a
larger number of policy questions on second-ordered dimensions. In sum, the findings of the
literature and our analysis suggest that the extent to which direct democratic institutions are
advisable as democratic correctives to representative systems depends on the political conflict
structure.
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The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 derives the theoretical model;
Section 3 discusses the data and the empirical design; Section 4 presents the empirical analysis
including instrumental variable regressions; Section 5 discusses the institutional implications of
the findings; and Section 6 concludes.
2 Theory
We approach the analysis of policy congruence with a theoretical model that shows how the
mechanism of direct democracy interacts with the elite-voter preference deviation. The stylized
model of policy production analyzes the effects of direct democracy under the scenarios of
“good” representation (i.e., a small preference deviation between the elite and the voters) and
“bad” representation (i.e., a large deviation). There are a number of formal analyses of direct
democracy that explore the initiative and referendum processes in a continuous policy space,
whereas the policy can be set arbitrarily far away from an ideal point (Romer and Rosenthal,
1978; Lupia, 1992; Streunenberg, 1992; Gerber, 1996; Hug, 2004). Following Besley and Coate
(2008), we adopt a discrete policy space (i.e., a law is either in place or not). The discrete
policy space has several advantages: first, the actors’ decision set is reduced to a discrete choice,
which is the kind of decision voters face at the ballot box; second, the model can account for
referendum and initiative processes; and, third, the discrete policy space allows us to estimate
the preferences of the political elite and the electorate on a common scale and thus to derive
consistent measures for policy congruence and preference deviations (see Section 4).
The model includes two players, the government (G) and the voters (V ), which both have
preferences measured on a continuous scale that represents the degree of support for a specific
binary policy decision (e.g., the introduction of a smoking ban).1 The game starts with a specific
law being present or not. The government moves first by choosing between two options: either
to maintain the status quo or to propose a policy change. In a second step, the voters either
accept the government’s move or, in case they disagree, they may use direct democratic rights
(i.e., calling for a referendum, if the government introduced a new law, or launching an initiative,
1We analyze the government as the relevant player of the political elite because we empirically investigate
Swiss cantons, where the governments are considered more powerful than the parliaments (Vatter, 2002).
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if the government maintained the status quo).2 If the voters use direct democratic action, the
government will lose the vote, and the majority of the electorate will be satisfied. Figure 3 in
Appendix A1 shows the game tree of this strategic interaction.
The use of direct democratic rights is associated with costs for the voters, as they have to
collect the necessary amount of signatures (cV ). In addition, both the government (cG) and the
voters (cV ) have to pay campaign costs in case of a popular vote.
3 Accordingly, we write the
following linear and symmetric utility functions for the government and the voters:
UG = −|xout − xG| − Idd · cG
UV = −|xout − xV | − Idd · cV ,
where Idd denotes the use of direct democratic institution (Idd = 1 if the voters call for
a referendum or launch an initiative; Idd = 0 if the voters do not take action). The final
policy outcome (xout) can either be 1 or 0, depending on whether the law is on the books or
not. The continuous preferences of the government (xG) and the voters (xV ) range from 0 (no
support) to 1 (full support). The electorate knows the preference of the government, which
acts first and communicates its position in the legislative process. The government, however,
does not know precisely the preference of the voters when it decides to change a law, because
government officials do not survey constantly the preferences of the electorate, and they cannot
fully anticipate the dynamics of a potential campaign (Romer and Rosenthal, 1979; Matsusaka
and McCarthy, 2001; Hug, 2004). Accordingly, the model assumes that the government acts
based on a belief of how strong the support in the electorate will be. Technically speaking, the
government receives a noisy signal, xˆV , which it uses to form a belief about the voters’ support
for a law. The belief follows a beta distribution (ensuring non-zero probability values between
0 and 1) with an unbiased estimate of the true preference as expected value (E(xˆV ) = xV ).
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For identifying the conditions of an equilibrium, we assume that a policy does not exist,
and we start with the electorate’s decision to use direct democratic rights (the last step of the
2Our model only has two players (there is no opposition using direct democratic rights). This simplification
would only be problematic if there were no organized political group that would collect signatures for a referendum
or an initiative in case the majority of voters disagrees with the government.
3The model does not consider electoral costs for the government in taking no action or proposing new laws.
4The first shape parameter is a function of xV and the second is constant (e.g., s2 = 30). Accordingly, as xV
increases, the government assigns higher probabilities to higher values for xV
(
∂F (xV )
∂xV
> 0
)
.
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game).5 In case the government prefers the status quo, the voters decide whether they want to
launch an initiative for the introduction of a new law.6 The voters’ utility from launching an
initiative is = −|1− xV | − cV , and their utility from not launching an initiative is = −|0− xV |.
They will collect signatures for a public vote whenever xV ≥ 1+cV2 (condition 1); that is, when
the support within the electorate (xV ) is greater than the costs of launching an initiative (cV ).
In case the government proposes a new law, the voters decide whether they want to block the
legislation with a referendum. The voters’ utility from calling a referendum is = −|0−xV |− cV ,
and their utility from not calling a referendum is = −|1−xP |. They will collect signatures for a
public vote whenever xV ≤ 1−cV2 (condition 2); that is, when the costs for calling a referendum
(cV ) are low enough compared to the preference (xV ). The bottom line of conditions 1 and 2 is
that the electorate weighs its preference against the costs of using direct democratic rights.
The first move in the game—namely, the government’s decision to propose a policy change—
is a function of the two discussed conditions that specify whether the voters will use direct
democratic rights. As discussed earlier, the government acts based on its beliefs about the
voters’ preference (xˆV ). The government’s decision of whether it should propose a new policy
depends on its own preference for a new law (xG), the costs of a potential public vote (cG), and
the anticipated probability that the voters will use direct democratic institutions.7 A detailed
derivation of the inequalities is presented in Appendix A1. Formally expressed, the government
introduces a new law, if condition 3 holds:
xG ≥ pref · (cG − 1)− pini · (cG + 1) + 1
2(1− pref − pini) ,
where pini and pref denote the probability that the voters will launch an initiative or call for
a referendum, which depends on voters’ preference and their costs of using direct democratic
rights (conditions 1 and 2). Condition 3 states that the government’s decision to introduce
a new law is a function of its own and the voters’ preferences as well as the usage costs of
5For the equilibrium solutions of the opposite scenario, see Appendix A1.
6As in other models of direct democracy, the government always loses in equilibrium when the voters call for
a public vote because direct democratic rights are only used in case of an electoral majority (e.g., Hug, 2004).
7The government’s belief of xP feeds into the expected probability of a referendum. The belief follows a beta
distribution and condition 2 (xP ≤ 1−cP2 ) provides pref =
∫ 1−cP
2
xP=0
x
α−1
P
(1−xP )β−1
B(α,β)
, whereas α and β are the shape
parameters and B(·) is the beta-function.
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direct democratic institutions. This condition suggests, for example, that the government may
propose laws that deviate from the majority view of the electorate, when the costs for the voters
to launch a referendum are high enough.8 Based on the derived conditions, we investigate how
the costs of using direct democratic rights affect the probability that policies are congruent with
the majority preference of the median voter, and whether the effect of direct democracy on
policy congruence is mediated by the government-voter preference deviation. To that end, we
run simulations with the following simulation parameters:
• The government has a strong preference for introducing a new policy (xG = 0.7).
• The support within the electorate for the policy varies between 0.1 and 1.0 (xP ∈ (0.1, 1.0)).
• The costs of using direct democratic rights are either moderate or high (cV = {0.35, 0.5}).
• To account for the government’s probabilistic beliefs regarding voters’ preference, we simulate 1,000
times xP . The shape parameters are: s1 =
xP ·s2
1−xP and s2 = 30 (see Footnote 4).
Figure 1 plots the comparative statics. The top plot shows how the probability of policy
congruence varies as a function of voters’ preferences. The preferences of the median voter and
the government are congruent in the area where the majority of the electorate supports the new
policy (xV > 0.5). In that area, the law will be introduced and the policy outcome is congruent
with the majority preference of the voters (see the 100% probability of policy congruence on
the right side of the upper plot). More interesting is the situation in which the preferences
of the voters and the government deviate; that is, when xV < 0.5. When only a few voters
support a new policy, the government will not introduce the policy because it anticipates that
the electorate will veto the proposal with a referendum due to the strong popular resistance,
and the resulting non-adoption of the policy is congruent with the will of the median voter
(see the 100% probability of policy congruence on the left side of the upper plot). However, as
the resistance within the electorate decreases (i.e., the voters’ support for the policy increases),
the lines start falling: the probability of policy congruence decreases because the voters start
refraining from blocking the new law, although the majority still opposes the new law.
For highlighting the effects of direct democracy on policy congruence, we manipulate the
costs of using direct democratic rights (cV ). The dashed black line shows the findings for a
8Appendix A2 presents the comparative statics and two plots for illustrating the key aspects of the model.
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medium level of direct democracy and the gray line for a high level of direct democracy. The
dashed line starts falling when the support in the electorate is at about only 20%, while the
turning point of the gray line (where xV =
1−cV
2 ) is at a electoral support of about 30%. Thus,
the more direct democratic a system is, the better the voters are shielded from being overruled
by a deviating preference of the government.9 The worst situation, from a policy congruence
perspective, is when a bare majority of the electorate are against the government’s proposal. In
that case, the voters will not overturn the government’s decision, even when the costs for calling
a referendum are low. The lower plot highlights the most interesting range between the turning
point of the gray line and the area before the electorate and the government share the same
view. The variation of voters’ resistance against the new policy is equivalent to the variation of
the government-voter preference deviation (the government’s support for the policy is constant
at xG = 0.7). The lower plot shows that as the preference deviation increases, the positive effect
of direct democracy on policy congruence becomes larger.
Based on the presented findings, we formulate the following theoretical predictions:
• Policies will be congruent with voters’ majority preference, if the government and the voters share
the same preference.
• Direct democratic institutions have a conducive effect on policy congruence, if the preferences of
the government and the voters deviate.
• If the preferences of the government and the voters deviate, the positive effect of direct democracy
on policy congruence increases as the deviation grows.
The first two predictions—namely, that policies will be congruent when the elite and the
voters share the same preferences and that direct democracy has a positive effect on policy
congruence—are quite well established in the literature.10 Our third prediction, however, that
the size of the positive direct democratic effect on policy congruence depends on the elite-
voter preference deviation is novel and interesting, as it suggests that in direct democratic
9If the government’s uncertainty about voters’ preferences decreases, the turning points of the lines will remain
the same. What changes is that the curves fall and rise faster. In the presented simulation we modeled the second
shape parameter to be fairly large (s2 = 30). The plotted curve for medium direct democracy shown in Figure 1
starts falling from 100% predicted policy congruence at the voters’ support of 20% and hits the 0%-probability of
policy congruence, where the voters’ support is at 40%. If we decrease the government’s uncertainty, by setting
s2 = 1, the falling part of the curve is between the more narrow range of 23% to 28% voters’ support.
10For an exception, see Besley and Coate (2008, 392), who predict a negative effect of direct democracy on
policy congruence under specific circumstances.
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Figure 1: Effects of Direct Democracy (DD) and Preferences on Policy Congruence.
systems a large preference deviation is good (not bad) for policy congruence. In other words,
the direct democratic mechanism of policy congruence works better under the scenario of “bad”
representation (i.e., a large preference deviation), essentially because a large deviation provides
clear signals to the government on the preferences of the voters. The mechanics of the theoretical
model suggest that the main effect of direct democracy on policy congruence is that the political
elite anticipate preference deviations and, in the case that voters have extensive direct democratic
rights, follow the position held by (the large) majority of voters. This institutional effect of
direct democracy is often referred to as the indirect effect of direct democracy—as opposed to
the direct effect, where the actual use of direct democracy drives the policy outcome. A strength
of the presented theory is that the key variables (the actors’ preferences and the costs of direct
democracy) are operationalizable, and we can thus empirically test the theoretical predictions.
8
3 Measuring Voters’ and Elites’ Policy Preferences
The key for the empirical analysis of our arguments is that the policies and preferences are
measured on the same metric. This is the case in our investigation, as we rely on elite and voter
surveys with binary questions that were designed and executed for this research. We asked Swiss
voters and politicians whether they support or reject 10 policies that cantons either have or do
not have (for the importance of using a binary metric, see Achen (1978); Erikson et al. (1993);
Matsusaka (2001); Hug (2011)). The 10 questions cover the most controversial policy questions
of the main policy areas in the competence of the cantons, such as tax, family, immigration,
education, and health-care policies. The surveys included questions on, for example, the pro-
gressivity of cantonal taxes, the voting rights of foreigners, and smoking bans (Appendix A3
lists all policy questions).11 The broad policy spectrum is important, as it allows us to rule out
that our empirical findings are biased because we selected specific policy areas.
We estimate voters’ policy preferences on the cantonal level with national survey data from
1,507 respondents. Measures for subnational units cannot be estimated by disaggregating the
national survey data, as there are only very few observations for some cantons (Levendusky
et al., 2008; Warshaw and Rodden, 2012). Thus, we take advantage of recent developments
in survey research by using multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP), which provides
good estimates, even when the samples for individual subnational units are small (Gelman and
Little, 1997; Park et al., 2004; Lax and Phillips, 2009a,b, 2012; Warshaw and Rodden, 2012;
Kastellec et al., 2010; Pacheco, 2012; Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2013). MRP estimates the
preferences of small constituencies in four steps. The first step is to conduct a survey that
collects, besides the policy questions, minimal personal information of the respondents (survey
step); in the second step, a hierarchical model is fitted to the data to make predictions for
specific hypothetical voters (response model step); in the third step, the model estimates are
used to make predictions for predefined hypothetical voters (prediction step); finally, based on
fine-grained census data, researchers calculate constituency support by weighting the estimated
preference of each hypothetical voter according to the number of voters who have the same
characteristics as the hypothetical voter in a specific constituency (post-stratification step).
11The survey was conducted in June 2012 with CATI.
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For identifying voter categories, we include gender, education (6 categories), domicile type
(4 categories), and age (4 groups). Altogether, this yields for each canton 192 distinct types of
voters (2×6×4×4). In the hierarchical model (response model step), we include random effects
for the four individual-level variables. Moreover, we add cantonal-level variables, such as the
shares of German speakers and of left party support, denoted by the matrix X, and we account
for regional variation.12 Finally, we include a cantonal random effect, a fixed effect based on
βX, and a random effect for the region.13 The model is specified as follows:
Pr(yi = 1) = Φ
(
β0 + α
gender
j[i]
+ αeducationk[i] + α
domicile
l[i] + α
age
m[i]
+ αcantonn[i]
)
αgenderj ∼ N(0, σ2gender), for j = 1, 2
αeducationk ∼ N(0, σ2education), for k = 1, ...., 6
αdomicilel ∼ N(0, σ2domicile), for l = 1, ..., 4
αagem ∼ N(0, σ2age), for m = 1, ..., 4
αcantonn ∼ N(αregiono[n] + βXn, σ2canton), for n = 1, ..., 26
αregiono ∼ N(0, σ2region), for o = 1, ..., 7
MRP takes advantage of the data structure, as we estimate a hypothetical voter’s predicted
support for a policy, based on all the people in the sample who share her attributes. Concretely,
when we estimate whether a 55–year–old woman with a university degree, who lives in a rural
village, supports a policy or not, we use information from the entire sample, but the estimates
are especially influenced by the answers from the 50– to 64–year–old people, the university
degree holders, the people living in rural areas, and the women. The property of partial pooling
is key for the accuracy of MRP, as we rely neither solely on the average for all voters of a canton,
nor on the average of the entire sample, but rather on the weighted mean of the two averages
(Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Gelman and Hill, 2007).
12Education categories: 1 (mandatory schooling or no response), 2 (apprenticeship), 3 (university-entrance
diploma [Matura], teachers college), 4 (additional job training [ho¨here Fachausbildung]), 5 (Advanced training
[Ho¨here Fachhochschule]), 6 (university degree including U. of App. Sciences); Domicile categories: 1 (urban
center), 2 (agglomeration), 3 (isolated city), 4 (rural area); Age categories: 1 (18-34 years), 2 (35-49 years), 3
(50-74 years), 4 (75- years); Region categories: 1 (Geneva, Valais, Vaud), 2 (Bern, Fribourg, Jura, Neuchaˆtel,
Solothurn), 3 (Aargau, Basel-Stadt, Basel-Landschaft), 4 (Zurich), 5 (Appenzell I. Rh., Appenzell A. Rh., Glarus,
Grisons, St. Gallen, Schaffhausen, Thurgau), 6 (Lucerne, Nidwalden, Obwalden, Schwyz, Uri, Zug), and 7 (Ticino).
13To specify the best (not over-fitted) response model, we estimated for each policy question 64 combinations of
five different cantonal predictors and chose the models that minimize AIC and BIC. For more detailed information
on the model specifications, see Appendix A4.2.
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Using the model estimates, we carry out steps 3 and 4 (prediction for all hypothetical voters
and post-stratification with census data). We have 192 different hypothetical voters in each
canton. For each of these hypothetical voters, the model predicts the probability with which
these voters support a policy. Since we have in addition information about the variation among
cantons, we create predictions (pˆing) for all hypothetical voters in each canton. In the final step
(post-stratification), we sum the predicted support among all hypothetical voters and weigh
each type by its frequency in a given canton (Nng) with data from the census (Nn is the total
number of eligible voters):
pˆin =
∑G
g∈n pˆingNng
Nn
Following these four steps, we estimate the cantonal support of the electorate for each policy.
Besides the cantonal preference of voters, we also estimate the preference of the elite (i.e., the
cantonal governments) with the same method. To that end, we conducted an online survey with
cantonal politicians. The survey asked cantonal politicians about their preferences for the 10
policies under investigation. We selected politicians from cantonal parties that represent more
than 10% of the electorate. The final sample consists of 431 respondents. Thanks to a targeted
follow-up survey, the sample includes at least three respondents for each cantonal party in the
sample.14 We again apply the four steps of the MRP method to derive cantonal elite preferences
using the elite survey data on the policy preferences of the cantonal politicians. However, for the
estimation of the elite preferences, we use a hierarchical model specification and weights for the
post-stratification that are tailored to the application of MRP for cantonal elite preferences. The
elite hierarchical model includes the party affiliation of cantonal politicians as an individual-level
variable, which is a very strong predictor of whether a cantonal politician supports a policy or
not. In addition, we again model cantonal-level variables and random effects for the cantons
14For the first online survey wave on March 15, 2013, we invited 1,046 cantonal politicians with personalized
e-mails to participate in the survey. After analyzing the sample of the first wave, we contacted, on March 28,
2013, 99 additional cantonal politicians from the yet underrepresented cantonal parties (again with personalized
e-mails). Of the total 476 received responses, we dropped 45 from the sample as they either included impossible
canton and party combinations or were double entries. The final sample consists of 431 respondents (38% of the
1,145 contacted politicians).
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and for the regions in the response model.15
In the next (third) step, we predict for each cantonal party the policy preferences with the
specification of the elite hierarchical model. Finally, in the post-stratification step, we derive
aggregated cantonal elite preference measures that are representative of the political strength
of the relevant parties in each canton. To that end, we weigh the predicted cantonal party
preferences with the government compositions of each canton. In short, we estimate cantonal
elite preferences for all 10 policies by first predicting policy support within each relevant cantonal
party based on our elite survey data, before aggregating the estimated party preferences to a
cantonal elite preference measure using government composition data. Appendix A4 provides
more detailed information on how we derive the preference measures for the voters and the elite
with MRP.
Our empirical design overcomes three major problems of the literature on the institutional
effects of direct democracy. First, most articles investigate whether specific policies (e.g., tax
levels) correlate with variation in direct democracy (Matsusaka, 2004; Feld and Kirchga¨ssner,
2000). The validity of these analyses hinges on the implicit (and implausible) assumption that
voters’ preferences are constant between the units of analysis. Second, studies analyzing voters’
preferences typically measure the preferences and policy outcomes on different scales (Achen,
1978; Erikson et al., 1993; Matsusaka, 2001; Hug, 2011). Third, many articles investigate only
a single or a few policy areas, which might bias the findings (Gerber, 1996; Lax and Phillips,
2009a). We overcome the mentioned problems by estimating, for various policy areas, the
preferences of the voters and the elite on the same (binary) metric as the policy outcomes.
The measures for policy congruence and for the elite-voter preference deviation are consistent
because of the common binary metric.
4 Empirical Analysis
The core idea of policy congruence is that the actions of representatives are in line with the
majority positions of voters. Following our definition of policy congruence, we analyze an out-
15We chose the combination of explanatory variables on the cantonal level in the response model (X) that
minimize AIC and BIC (see Footnote 13).
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come variable that codes whether a policy in a given canton is supported by the majority of
the citizens or not (Lax and Phillips, 2009a, 2012). We rely on this binary measure of policy
congruence for conceptual and methodological reasons. Conceptually, policy congruence is not
about the degree of support for a policy in the electorate. Rather, the basic question is whether
a majority of voters is in favor of a policy or not.16 Methodologically, the dichotomy of the
policies (i.e., they are either in place or not) is important because this allows us to measure
policies and preferences on a common (binary) metric. This common metric is also reflected
in the binary coding of policy congruence, which essentially combines the measures of the pref-
erences of voters and the policy outcomes. Of course, the binary measurement of policies and
policy congruence simplifies political realities. However, we believe that the costs of reducing
complexity are more than compensated by the gains in conceptual clarity and methodological
rigor.
The two main explanatory variables of the theoretical model presented in Section 2 are the
costs of using direct democratic rights and the elite-voter preference deviation. To measure the
costs of direct democracy usage, we rely on a widely used index of direct democratic rights (Frey
and Stutzer, 2000; Freitag and Vatter, 2006; Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter, 2011; Stadelmann-
Steffen and Freitag, 2011). The index measures how difficult it is to use direct democracy, for
example, in terms of the time granted to collect signatures and the number of signatures required
(Stutzer, 1999; Frey and Stutzer, 2000). In line with the theoretical model, the direct democracy
measure accounts for the usage costs for citizens to successfully call for a referendum or to
launch an initiative (high values on the index imply low costs and thus more direct democracy).
Appendix A5 shows the variation of the direct democracy index and compares the values of the
Swiss cantons to the level of direct democracy in California. In comparative perspective, Swiss
cantons vary between a low level of direct democracy and a very high level. The elite-voter
preference deviation is measured as the absolute distance between the government’s and the
voters’ preferences in case they hold opposing majority opinions (if they agree, the variable is
set to 0).
As control variables, we use measures of the clarity of the government and voter opinions,
16We coded whether a policy was cantonal law when the surveys were conducted (that is, at the end of 2012).
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coded as the absolute deviation from 0.5, because the findings on the preference-deviation vari-
able could be driven by extreme voter or government opinions (Lax and Phillips, 2009a). In
addition, we control for a number of institutional, economic, cultural, and structural variables.
We include measures of the electoral threshold and the power of the legislator vis-a`-vis the
government, expecting that low electoral thresholds and powerful legislators are associated with
higher policy congruence (Kaiss, 2010; Bochsler and Bousbah, 2015). Furthermore, we control
for economic, cultural, political, and structural heterogeneity among the cantons by modeling
GDP per capita, population size, the strength of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), and the share
of German speaking citizens. Particularly, the language variable is of importance because di-
rect democracy is more comprehensive in the German speaking part of Switzerland. Finally,
we model a dummy variable that codes for each canton and policy whether there has been a
public vote or not in the three years prior to the surveys (that is, 2010 − 2012).17 This di-
rect democracy in use measure is important because scholars differentiate between the effects
of direct democracy in use (policies are decided on the ballot) and the effects of the threat of
a possible referendum or initiative on the behavior of legislators. As it is conventional in the
literature and consistent with our theoretical model, we rely on an institutional measure on
the usage costs of direct democratic rights as our main explanatory variable (Matsusaka, 1995;
Gerber, 1996; Stutzer, 1999). However, including the dummy variable on the actual use of direct
democracy allows us to analyze whether policies are primarily congruent because voters have
made decisions at the ballot box.
We analyze cross-nested hierarchical probit models with random effects for policies and
cantons. The first model includes the institutional direct democracy measure. The estimates
reported in Table 1 confirm the positive and significant effect of direct democratic institutions
on policy congruence. In the second model, we introduce the preference deviation variable.
The findings show, as suggested by the work of the representation literature, that preference
deviation is a significant predictor of policy incongruence: the more the people and the govern-
ment disagree, the less likely is policy congruence. In the third model, we empirically test the
main prediction of the theoretical model—namely, that the positive effect of direct democracy
17Own coding based on data from the Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (c2d). The findings are the
same if we extend the lag to five or more years.
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increases, as the preference deviation between the voters and the government becomes larger.
To investigate that prediction, we include an interaction between the preference deviation and
direct democracy. Model 3 includes all three explanatory variables that are motivated by the
theoretical model. As expected, the interaction term is positive and significant. This finding
supports our main prediction that the positive effect of direct democracy increases, the more
the preferences of the voters and the elite are at odds (a hypothesis test for the significance
of the interaction term is presented below). The empirical findings also confirm the prediction
that direct democratic institutions have no effect on policy congruence, if the government and
the people both support or reject a policy (i.e., Deviation= 0).
In order to test our main hypothesis against alternative explanatory factors, the full Model
4 includes all controls as well as the direct democracy in use variable. The results of Model 4 are
essentially identical to the estimates of Model 3. Most importantly, the positive and significant
effect of the interaction term corroborates the main prediction of the model that the conducive
effect of direct democracy on policy congruence increases as a function of the degree of the dis-
sonance between the government and voter preferences. Model 4 further shows that government
and voter opinion clarities are significant predictors of policy congruence, but controlling for
extreme voter or government opinions does not alter the findings on the preference-deviation
variable. The only other significant predictor is the share of German speakers (policy congru-
ence is more widespread in German speaking cantons). Finally, the estimates of the direct
democracy in use variable suggest that it does not matter for policy congruence whether the
electorate has voted on an issue or not (note that the model also includes the usage costs of
direct democratic rights and the interaction effect). According to this non-finding, policy con-
gruence is not primarily driven by the usage of direct democracy, which is consistent with both
our theoretical model and the conventional view in the literature (Matsusaka, 1995; Gerber,
1996). Appendix A6 reports robustness checks using alternative measures of direct democracy
and of the preference deviation between the government and the voters. The results for the
main explanatory variables are robust.
Besides the robustness to alternative specifications, a further concern related to the validity
of the presented findings is the potential endogeneity that policy congruence influences (in
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Direct Democracy 0.19∗∗ 0.12 −0.20
(0.09) (0.10) (0.17)
Government-Voter Preference Deviation −2.57∗∗ −14.17∗∗∗ −14.71∗∗∗
(1.00) (5.32) (5.52)
DD x Preference Deviation 2.46∗∗ 2.72∗∗
(1.10) (1.15)
Voter Opinion Clarity 3.44∗∗
(1.52)
Government Opinion Clarity −2.15∗∗
(1.08)
GDP (per capita in 100k) 0.00
(0.54)
Electoral Threshold −0.01
(0.01)
% German speakers 1.16∗∗
(0.55)
Legislative Power −0.06
(1.05)
Population Size (in 100k) −0.02
(0.04)
SVP Vote share −0.01
(0.02)
DD in Use (past 3 years) −0.29
(0.27)
Constant −0.81∗ 0.14 −0.36 0.52
(0.41) (0.19) (0.45) (1.19)
CPC 71% 68% 69% 72%
BIC 360.19 359.21 358.65 390.44
`` -168.97 -168.48 -162.64 -153.52
N 260 260 260 260
Groups: Cantons 26 26 26 26
Groups: Policies 10 10 10 10
Variance: Canton 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.00
Variance: Policy 0.33 0.25 0.26 0.19
CPC: Correctly predicted cases; baseline is 51%.***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table 1: Cross-Nested Hierarchical Probit Model Estimates of the Effects of Direct Democracy
and Government-Voter Preference Deviation on Policy Congruence.
reverse model direction) the extent of direct democracy in the cantons, which would invalidate
the above discussed inferences. To out rule potential endogeneity, we run 2SLS IV estimation
using the degree of direct democracy at the end of the 19th century as an instrument for direct
democratic institutions in 2010. The analysis relies on the Historical Direct Democracy Index,
which dates back to 1803 (Leemann, 2014). The instrument fulfills the exclusion restriction,
when the degree of direct democracy in the 19th century is independent from the error term of
the second-stage regression. This assumption is violated in case of reverse causation, or if the
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historical institutions affect the outcome through another causal pathway than the instrumented
variable. The former is unproblematic because policy congruence today cannot be the cause of
institutional settings of the 19th century. The latter is relevant when the historical institutions
affect a variable that is not modeled in the second stage, but influences the outcome even after
controlling for all other explanatory factors. We cannot think of such an alternative causal
pathway.
To asses the strength of the instrument, we use the F-statistic of the instrument in the first
stage model. The direct democracy index from the end of the 19th century achieves an F value
of 12.45, which is clearly higher than the conventional threshold of 10 (Stock et al., 2002).18
We perform 2SLS IV estimation for the theoretically motivated Model 3 as well as for the full
Model 4 of Table 1 (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Table 2 reports the findings of the first- and
second-stage models. The estimates are by and large the same as the ones discussed above.
Most importantly, the interaction effect between direct democracy and the government-voter
preference deviation is clearly positive and significant in both models, corroborating the main
argument of this analysis.
Figure 2 illustrates the size of the interaction effect relying on the estimates of Model 3 of
Table 1. Reported are the predicted probabilities of policy congruence, including the uncertainty
of the predictions (Herron, 1999; Gelman and Hill, 2007). The x-axis displays the government-
voter preference deviation and the y-axis the predicted probability of policy congruence. The
solid line reports the predictions for a very low level of direct democracy (limited DD) and
the dotted line for a hypothetical canton with high values of direct democracy (extensive DD).
The increase in direct democracy from limited to extensive has two effects: first, citizens in
cantons with more direct democracy more often get what they want. The probability of policy
congruence is always higher, no matter how large the preference deviation is. For example,
for a small value of the preference deviation (0.00), the difference in predicted probabilities of
policy congruence between limited and extensive direct democracy is about 16.8% (95% CI:
[−0.03, 35.18]), while this measure increases to 40.7% (95% CI: [16.86, 58.28]) for a slightly more
18We account for the uncertainty of the first-stage model in the estimation by simulating 500 first-stage
predictions, which are then translated into second-stage estimations. Because the canton of Jura did not exist
before 1973, we cannot use the instrument for this case and have therefore dropped the canton from the analysis.
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Model 6 Model 3 IV Model 4 IV
1st Stage 2nd Stage 2nd Stage
Direct Democracy (19th Century) 0.43∗∗∗
(0.12)
Government-Voter Preference Deviation 2.16∗∗ −15.67∗∗ −15.00∗∗
(0.98) (6.10) (6.13)
Direct Democracy 0.22∗ 0.02
(0.13) (0.19)
DD x Preference Deviation 2.79∗∗ 2.79∗∗
(1.27) (1.28)
Voter Opinion Clarity 3.19∗∗
(1.56)
Government Opinion Clarity −1.51
(1.12)
GDP (per capita in 100k) 0.24
(0.64)
Electoral Threshold −0.01
(0.01)
% German speakers 0.73
(0.52)
Legislative Power 0.02
(1.07)
Population Size (in 100k) −0.00
(0.03)
SVP vote share −0.00
(0.02)
DD in Use (past 3 years) −0.26
(0.27)
Constant 2.54∗∗∗ −0.78 −0.59
(0.41) (0.58) (1.35)
R2 0.48
BIC 340.71 379.36
`` -153.79 -148.17
N 25 250 250
Groups: Cantons 25 25
Groups: Policies 10 10
Variance: Canton 0.03 0.02
Variance: Policy 0.30 0.28
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table 2: 2SLS IV Probit Model Estimates with 19th Century Institutions as Instruments.
sizable preference deviation (0.10).
Second, the differences in the predicted probabilities also document the interaction effect
between direct democracy and the preference deviation: the difference in the predicted prob-
abilities between limited and extensive direct democracy increases as the deviation becomes
larger (that is, the effectiveness of adding direct democratic rights on policy congruence grows,
the larger the preference deviation). The interaction effect is clearly significant, as the confi-
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dence interval of the difference in the differences shows (∆(∆pˆ) =24.38% (95% CI: [2.52, 43.42])
(Brambor et al., 2006; Tsai and Gill, 2013). In short, the robust and significant results sup-
port the main prediction of our theoretical model—namely, that the positive effect of direct
democratic institutions increases, as the elite-voter preference deviation becomes larger.19
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Government-Voter Preference Deviation
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 P
ol
icy
 C
on
gr
ue
nc
e
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Extensive DD
Limited DD
Figure 2: Interaction Effect of Direct Democracy and the Government-Voter Preference Devia-
tion on Policy Congruence.
Figure 2 also shows that the effect of the preference deviation on policy congruence turns
from positive to negative when we change the decision making from strongly to limited direct
democratic (the line goes down). This may need further explanation. In general, a large
preference deviation between the elite and the citizens means that the preference of the electorate
is not well represented in policy making. Bad representation is bad for policy congruence.
The model-based predictions for a system with very limited direct democratic rights shows the
dominance of that effect. The slope falls because the negative effect of the preference gap on
policy congruence dominates. In other words, the costs of using direct democracy become too
19A potential objection against the hypothesis tests is that we underestimated the full uncertainty in Models 1
to 4 because some explanatory variables are measured with uncertainty (the preference variables) (see, e.g., Lewis
and Linzer, 2005). To account for the full uncertainty, we estimate the same models relying on 1,000 posterior
draws of the preference predictions (first stage), rerun the models for each draw, and save 30 draws of the second-
stage posterior. The resulting sum of draws reflects both the uncertainty from measurement (first stage) and
the variation in the estimated coefficients (second stage). This approach still yields a significant difference of
differences estimate (on the 0.05 α-level).
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high to correct the growing preference gap. This does not apply, however, for a political system
with a high level of direct democracy. In such a system, a large elite-voter preference deviation
is conducive for policy congruence because the elites know that voters are so strongly opposed to
their position that the intervening factors (i.e., the imprecision of the preference signal and the
usage costs of direct democratic institutions) become inconsequential. Thus, in strongly direct
democratic polities, a large elite-voter preference deviation empowers the electorate to overturn
the deviating preferences of the elite.
5 Direct Democracy and the Political Conflict Structure
The finding that the effect of direct democracy on policy congruence depends on the preferences
of the elite and the voters may explain why some scholars have found evidence that direct
democracy leads to more policy congruence (Gerber, 1996, 1999; Matsusaka, 2004, 2010), while
others could not replicate that result (Lascher et al., 1996; Lax and Phillips, 2009a, 2012;
Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2014). Direct democracy has no unique and constant effect on
policy congruence. The main finding of our analysis—that direct democracy becomes more
conducive for policy congruence the more the preferences of the people and the elite deviate—
raises the question of when we would expect large preference gaps and thus strong effects of
direct democracy.
Representation scholars argue that competitive and fair elections constantly minimize the
elite-voter preference gap through selection and sanctioning: citizens (s)elect representatives
with similar preferences and sanction incumbents by not re-electing them if their behavior in
office deviates from the majority will of the electorate (Schumpeter, 1942; Mansbridge, 2009).
Scholars of direct democracy, however, have emphasized that this electoral mechanism can-
not democratically accommodate all policies in a multidimensional policy space. Here lies the
powerful property of direct democracy: referendums and initiatives allow it to unbundle policy
issues (Besley and Coate, 2008). In other words, citizens can also influence the outcomes of poli-
cies that are not democratically accommodated by elections, when they live in representative
democracies that are complemented with direct democratic institutions.20
20Direct democratic systems and representative democracies are often described as distinct models (Held,
20
The effectiveness of the direct democratic and the representative mechanisms of policy con-
gruence thus depend on the political environments. Politics in modern democracies is typically
dominated by a main political conflict dimension on the left-right spectrum. In a polity with
a one-dimensional political conflict structure, competitive and fair elections should regularly
minimize the elite-voter preference gap for the overwhelming majority of policies. Adding di-
rect democratic institutions in that case would only matter for the rare policies not covered by
the main political conflict dimension. Accordingly, the effects of direct democracy on policy
congruence should be limited because we expect only rare and small elite-voter preference gaps.
An example of a polity with a one-dimensional policy space is the United States in the last
130 years, where a large share of issues aligned on the liberal-conservative dimension (McCarty
et al., 2006).
Unlike in the United States, political conflict in most European countries spans over a mul-
tidimensional policy space (Kriesi et al., 2008).21 The dominant (first) dimension usually covers
the classic left-right economic conflict, while the second-ordered dimensions include, among
others, moral and cultural policy questions (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014). If parties compete
primarily along the economic (distributional) dimension, we would expect elections to accomo-
date the policies on the first dimension. In that case, direct democratic institutions should
be powerful in aligning second-ordered policies with the majority preference of the electorate.
Taken together, the insights of the representation literature and the unbundling argument sug-
gest that direct democratic institutions are effective democratic correctives for policy questions
not covered by the dominant (first) dimension.
We find empirical evidence supporting the argument that the effectiveness of direct democ-
racy depends on the political conflict structure. First, the majority of initiatives raised over
the last 50 years in Switzerland were concerned with polices on the second-ordered dimension
1996). Kriesi (2005, 6), however, argues that for empirical research, this distinction is “overdrawn” because we
usually analyze democratic polities that are enriched with direct democratic elements. This is also true for Swiss
cantons, which are representative systems complemented to varying degrees by direct democratic institutions
(see Appendix A5). Most scholars argue that adding direct democratic institutions to representative democracies
fosters the participatory capacity of voters (Kriesi, 2005; Matsusaka, 2005). Stadelmann-Steffen and Freitag
(2011, 527) make the contrasting point that the combination of representation and direct democracy “offers the
least advantageous environment for the development of civic engagement.”
21We rely on this stylized distinction between one- and two-dimensional polities for clarifying the argument.
Political competition occurs on multiple dimensions in all democratic systems.
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(Leemann, 2015). Second, according to the data of this study, the preference gap between the
elite and voters is larger for policies not covered by the (dominant) first dimension. Third, the
analysis of the data also suggests that the effect of direct democracy on policy congruence is
driven by the policies that are not covered by the first dimension. As a cautionary note, we
would like to emphasize that the dimensionality analysis of our data relies on the strong assump-
tion that the political conflict structure is the same in all the 26 cantons. The findings are thus
more suggestive than conclusive (see Appendix A7 for a detailed discussion of the dimensionality
analysis and its limitations).
In sum, we conclude that the insights of previous research and the analysis of our data
point in the same direction: whether it is—from a policy congruence perspective—advisable
to introduce direct democratic institutions as democratic correctives to representative systems
depends on the political conflict structure (i.e., the dimensionality of the political space). This
broader institutional implication of our analysis illustrates that direct democratic institutions
interact in a complex way with the key elements of representative democracies.
6 Conclusion
This article presented a theoretical model of how direct democratic institutions achieve policy
congruence. The formal model showed that the positive effect of direct democracy on pol-
icy congruence increases, as the elite-voter preference deviation grows. This finding suggests,
in contrast to the argument of representation scholars, that “bad” representation is in direct
democratic systems conducive for policy congruence, mainly because it provides a clear signal
that the elite and the voters disagree on some policy issue. For the empirical analysis, we relied
on original elite and voter survey data for 10 different policies of Swiss cantons, which provide
unique variation on direct democratic institutions. The specification of the empirical model
followed directly from the theoretical analysis, and the empirical results were as predicted and
robust across different specifications (also in models with an instrument for the institutional
variable). To the best of our knowledge, this analysis is the first policy congruence study that
investigates theoretically and empirically the connection between direct democratic institutions
and the preferences of the voters and the elite over multiple policy areas.
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Some points of concern need to be discussed. Objections against the formal model might be
that the equilibrium predicts the absence of referendums and that the government always loses
direct democratic votes. Both are obviously not the case in the real world. However, we believe
that this does not limit the insights the model provides in respect to the direct democratic
mechanism of policy congruence we have analyzed. According to the theoretical model and
empirical findings, the main democratic power of direct democracy is that the political elite
anticipate preference deviations and, in the case that voters have extensive direct democratic
rights, follow the position held by (the large) majority of voters. This is often referred to as
the indirect effect of direct democracy. Of course, policy outcomes can also become congruent
through the use of direct democratic rights (that is, the direct effect of direct democracy).
However, the empirical results, in support of the theoretical model, do not suggest that this
direct effect of direct democracy on policy congruence is strong.
The model’s discrete policy space might be subject to criticism too. We argue that for direct
democratic decision making, this simplification is appropriate because voters face a discrete
choice at the ballot box. Nevertheless, we would like to emphasize that the political elite has
non-binary room to maneuver for shifting away from voters’ preferences, particularly in the
implementation of laws. The discrete policy space might thus be an inappropriate simplification
for some stages of the policy cycle, like the implementation stage, but less so for the decision-
making part we analyzed in this study. In any case, the fact that the political elite has some
discretion in the implementation of policies highlights the limitations of direct democratic control
(Gerber et al., 2000). A further question in that regard is to what extent well-organized and
heavily funded interest groups control the use of direct democratic institutions and the content
of direct democratic campaigns. The more this is the case, the less accurate is our theoretical
distinction between the preferences of the elites and the voters. This is less problematic in the
small-sized Swiss cantons, where these kind of interest groups hardly exist, as compared to U.S.
states like California (Broder, 2000).
Hug (2009) forcefully argues in a recent critique of the literature on direct democracy that
further research is needed to better understand how direct democratic institutions interact with
the key elements of representative democracy. As far as policy congruence is concerned, we
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believe our analysis provides a nuanced account of how adding participatory elements to rep-
resentative democracies affects democratic performance. The presented findings show that the
extent to which direct democratic institutions lead to more policy congruence depends on the
elite-voter preference deviation. More specifically, the democratic effect of direct democracy
is most effective in cases of “bad” representation. Finally, the discussion of the institutional
implications of the findings suggests that initiatives and referendums are most likely effective
democratic correctives to representative systems in polities with multidimensional conflict struc-
tures.
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A1 Formal Analysis
A1.1 Supplements to the Theoretical Analysis of Section 2
Figure 3 illustrates the setup of the model discussed in Section 2, where we analyze the following
status quo (s.q.): there is no law and the government either proposes a new law or takes no
action (see gray part of Figure 3). The next subsection shows the mirror equilibrium analysis
for the case that the law exists and the government either takes no action or abolishes the law
(see black part of Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Theoretical Model: Extensive Form
Section 2 discusses condition 3, which formalizes the government’s decision to propose a new
law, without providing the formal derivation of the inequality condition. Condition 3 is derived
from the government’s expected utilities as follows:
E
[
UG(proposing L)
] ≥ E[UG(no action)]
pref · UG(L|DD) + (1− pref) · UG(L|DD) ≥ pini · UG(L|DD) + (1− pini) · UG(L|DD)
pref · (−|0− xG| − cG) + (1− pref) · (−|1− xG|) ≥ pini · (−|1− xG| − cG) + (1− pini) · (−|0− xG|)
xG ≥ pref · (cG − 1)− pini · (cG + 1) + 1
2(1− pref − pini)
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A1.2 Mirror Equilibrium
We explore in the following the mirror equilibrium analysis for the case that the law exists (see
black part of Figure 3), assuming that the government does not change the status quo and
that the voters can either accept the law or launch an initiative. To find the conditions for an
equilibrium, we again start with the last node in the game tree. The voters launch an initiative,
if the following condition 4 holds (equivalent to condition 2 in Section 2):
UV (L|DD) ≥ UV (L|DD)
−|0− xV | − cV ≥ −|1− xV |achmamamiaNote: 0 ≤ xG, xV ≤ 1
−xV − cV ≥ xV − 1
xV ≤ 1− cV
2
In case the government decides to abolish the law, the voters call for a referendum, if condition
5 holds (equivalent to condition 2 in Section 2):
UV (L|DD) ≥ UV (L|DD)
−|1− xV | − cV ≥ −|0− xV |achmamamiaNote: 0 ≤ xG, xV ≤ 1
xV − 1− cV ≥ −xV
xV ≥ 1 + cV
2
The government can either propose to change the law or stick with the status quo. Either way,
the government has to take into account the possibility that the electorate will overturn its
decision with the use of direct democratic rights. For both actions (keeping or abolishing the
law) the government forms expected utilities with some uncertainty about the exact position
of the median voter’s ideal point. Based on these expected utilities, we derive the following
condition 6, which formalizes the government’s decision (and is equivalent to condition 3, see
Subsection A1.1):
E
[
UG(keeping L)
] ≥ E[UG(abolishing L)]
pini · UG(L|DD) + (1− pinit) · UG(L|DD) ≥ pref · UG(L|DD) + (1− pref) · UG(L|DD)
pini · (−|0− xG| − cG) + (1− pini) · (−|1− xG|) ≥ pref · (−|1− xG| − cG) + (1− pref) · (−|0− xG|)
xG ≥ pini · (cG − 1)− pref · (cG + 1) + 1
2(1− pref − pinit)
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A2 Comparative Statics
Figure 4 plots comparative statics based on the theoretical model, illustrating how the costs
of direct democratic action affect each player’s decisions. Let us start with the left plot. The
y−axis shows the government’s support for a new law and the x−axis voters’ costs to launch
a campaign. The government’s decision to propose a new law is a function of its own support
for the reform and the direct democratic usage costs for voters. When the electorate can easily
call for a referendum (i.e., the costs of using direct democratic rights for voters are small), the
government will only enact new laws that it strongly supports. But as the costs for the voters
increase, the government will propose a law that is supported by only a small majority within
the government. Another way to illustrate the effect of direct democratic institutions is shown in
the right plot. The y−axis plots again the government support for a new law and the x−axis the
median voter’s preference. The stronger the electorate’s supports for a bill (although overall still
rejecting it, as xP < 0.5), the more inclined the government is to pass the law. The comparison
between the solid and the dashed line shows that the government is more responsive to the
median voter’s preference, if the usage costs for direct democracy are lower (see comparison
between solid and dashed lines).
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Figure 4: Comparative Statics Illustrating How Direct Democracy Affects Player’s Decisions.
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A3 Policy Items and Responses (our translation)
Tax Policies
Policy 1 The canton grants special tax cuts for wealthy foreigners.
Survey question wording: “Do you support or oppose special tax rules for foreign-
ers?” (German: In den meisten Kantonen profitieren vermo¨gende Ausla¨nderinnen
und Ausla¨nder von vorteilhaften Steuerkonditionen in der Form der Pauschalbesteuerung.
Sind Sie fu¨r oder gegen die Pauschalbesteuerung von Ausla¨ndern?)
Policy 2 The canton has an above-average tax progressivity.
Survey question wording: “Do you prefer living in a canton with above- or below-
average tax progressivity?” (German: Personen mit hohem Einkommen versteuern
einen ho¨heren Anteil des Einkommens als Personen mit tieferen Einkommen. Die
Steuerprogression zwischen den Kantonen ist dabei sehr unterschiedlich. Mo¨chten Sie
perso¨nlich in einem Kanton leben mit u¨berdurchschnittlich starker Steuerprogression
oder lieber in einem Kanton mit vergleichsweise schwacher Steuerprogression?)
Policy 3 The canton has an income tax for single persons with CHF 100k income of 12% or
more.
Survey question wording: “Do you think that a single person with a gross an-
nual income of CHF 100k should pay more or less than 12% sub-national income
taxes?” (German: Finden Sie eine ledige Person mit einem Bruttoeinkommen von
100’000 Schweizer Franken sollte mehr oder weniger als 12% Einkommenssteuer an
den Kanton und die Gemeinde bezahlen?)
Immigration and Foreigners
Policy 4 The canton grants foreigners voting rights in municipal matters.
Survey question wording: “Do you think that foreigners should have the right to
vote on municipal referendums?” (German: Sollten Ausla¨nderinnen und Ausla¨nder
an Abstimmungen auf Gemeindeebene teilnehmen du¨rfen?)
Policy 5 The canton allows naturalization decisions to be made in town hall meetings.
Survey question wording: “Do you think that naturalizations should be decided
at town hall meetings or by municipal governments?” (German: Sind Sie der Mei-
nung das Einbu¨rgerungsverfahren an Gemeindeversammlungen entschieden werden
sollen oder sollen Fachgremien beziehungsweise der Gemeinderat u¨ber Einbu¨rgerun-
gen entscheiden.)
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Education and Family Policies
Policy 6 The canton grants those with children tax credits of 5,000 CHF or more.
Survey question wording: “Do you think that a tax credit for children of CHF
5k is too high or too low?” (German: Familien ko¨nnen pro Kind einen fixen Be-
trag vom steuerbaren Einkommen abziehen. Finden Sie 5’000 Schweizer Franken als
Kinderabzug zu viel oder zu wenig?)
Policy 7 The teaching of a second foreign language starts in 5th grade or later.
Survey question wording: “What is the best point in time to start teaching a
second foreign language – fifth grade or later?” (German: Wann finden Sie, ist der
richtige Zeitpunkt eine zweite Fremdsprache zu unterrichten? Im 5. Schuljahr oder
spa¨ter?)
Health-Care Policies
Policy 8 Cantonal administrations automatically contact all people eligible for health-care
subsidies.
Survey question wording: “Do you think that public authorities should contact
people who are eligible for health-care subsidies by themselves?” (German: Finden
Sie es richtig, wenn die Verwaltung automatisch all jene kontaktiert, die gema¨ss
Steuererkla¨rung berechtigt sind Pra¨mienverbilligungen zu erhalten?)
Policy 9 The canton grants health-care subsidies to families with two children and an annual
income of CHF 90k.
Survey question wording: “Do you think that a family with two children and an
annual income of CHF 90k should receive health-care subsidies?” (German: Finden
Sie eine Familie mit zwei Kindern und einem Jahreseinkommen von 90’000 Schweizer
Franken, soll Pra¨mienverbilligung erhalten?)
Policy 10 The canton allows physicians to sell prescription medicine directly to patients.
Survey question wording: “Should physicians be allowed to sell medication (or
only pharmacists)?” (German: Sind Sie dafu¨r dass A¨rztinnen und A¨rzte in ihrer
Praxis Medikamente abgeben du¨rfen?)
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A4 Multilevel Regression with Post-Stratification (MRP)
The following discusses in more detail the applied MRP model specifications and further inves-
tigates the elite preference measures.
A4.1 Response
Each hierarchical response model has a number of fixed and random effects. The models used
to estimate voters preferences include six random effects: sex, education, domicile type, age,
canton, and region. The response models for the elite have three random effects (party, canton,
region). The difference in specifications reflects the distinct weighting in the post-stratification
step. In case of the voter survey, we rely on a number of individual-level variables such as age
and gender that are reported in the census data. In case of the elite measure, the “population”
for which we post-stratify is the political power structure of the elite. Accordingly, we use
data based on party strength in the government as weights in the post-stratification of the elite
measure. As fixed effects in the hierarchical model, we relied in both MRP applications on six
cantonal explanatory variables: the shares of German speakers (BfS, 2012), of Roman-Catholics
(BfS, 2012), of university degree holders (BfS, 2012), of left party voters in the 2011 national
elections (BfS, 2013), of right party voters in the 2011 election (BfS, 2013), and GDP per capita
(BAK Basel Economics).
A4.2 Model Selection
The models were selected based on data fit determined by AIC and BIC. We rely on AIC
and BIC because these measures allow us to evaluate the trade-off between data fit and model
complexity. Since we are interested in predictions, over-fitting is a problem (Babyak, 2004).
Relying on model quality measures that punish complexity provides a possible remedy for over-
fitting. The following overview lists the variables used for the different survey questions:
• x2.1 = % of German speakers
• x2.2 = % of Roman Catholics
• x2.3 = GDP per capita
• x2.4 = % of university degree holders
• x2.5 = % of left party voters
• x2.6 = % of right party voters
Selected Response Models (Voters)
1. y1 ∼ x2.1 + αsex + αeducation + αage + αdomicile + αcanton + αregion
2. y2 ∼ x2.5 + αsex + αeducation + αage + αdomicile + αcanton + αregion
3. y3 ∼ x2.4 + αsex + αeducation + αage + αdomicile + αcanton + αregion
4. y4 ∼ x2.1 + αsex + αeducation + αage + αdomicile + αcanton + αregion
5. y5 ∼ x2.5 + αsex + αeducation + αage + αdomicile + αcanton + αregion
6. y6 ∼ αsex + αeducation + αage + αdomicile + αcanton + αregion
7. y7 ∼ x2.1 + αsex + αeducation + αage + αdomicile + αcanton + αregion
8. y8 ∼ x2.1 + αsex + αeducation + αage + αdomicile + αcanton + αregion
9. y9 ∼ x2.4 + αsex + αeducation + αage + αdomicile + αcanton + αregion
10. y10 ∼ x2.1 + αsex + αeducation + αage + αdomicile + αcanton + αregion
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Selected Response Models (Elite)
1. y1 ∼ x2.2 + αparty + αcanton + αregion
2. y2 ∼ x2.4 + x2.6 + αparty + αcanton + αregion
3. y3 ∼ x2.6 + αparty + αcanton + αregion
4. y4 ∼ x2.6 + αparty + αcanton + αregion
5. y5 ∼ x2.1 + αparty + αcanton + αregion
6. y6 ∼ x2.1 + αparty + αcanton + αregion
7. y7 ∼ x2.1 + αparty + αcanton + αregion
8. y8 ∼ x2.1 + αparty + αcanton + αregion
9. y9 ∼ x2.2 + x2.4 + αparty + αcanton + αregion
10. y10 ∼ x2.1 + x2.5αparty + αcanton + αregion
A4.3 Exogeneity of Elite Responses
One concern is that politicians do not answer the questions sincerely, but give answers that
they believe are in line with their constituency. If that were the case, the validity of the model
estimates would be questioned. We show this is most likely not the case by comparing the
estimates with respect to their constituency and their party. The analysis presented below
investigates the extent to which politicians’ responses are a function of their party affiliation
and the position of their constituency. Table A4 reports the results for policy question 1 (the
results are robust for all 10 policy questions).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant 0.86∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.10) (0.07)
FE Parties X X X
FE Cantons X X X
R2 0.63 0.10 0.67
BIC 257.7 740.3 357.8
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table A4: Exogeneity of Elite Preferences
If politicians’ answers were to a certain degree endogenous, they should vary by constituency
and not by party. However, the model with the best BIC value only includes the party indicators
(Model 1), which shows that party affiliation is a very strong predictor of a cantonal politician’s
policy preferences. This result is in line with more recent research showing that politicians
might be ill-equipped to estimate their constituency’s preferences. Broockman and Skovron
(2015, 1) document with a large survey of 2,000 legislative candidates that “actual district
opinion explains only a modest share of the variation in politicians’ perceptions of their districts’
views.” Of relevance in that regard may be that the elite survey was carried out anonymously,
which should increase the chances that the politicians state their true preferences.
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A5 The Direct Democracy Measure
The presented empirical analyses rely on a widely used direct democracy index measuring how
difficult it is to use direct democratic rights (Stutzer, 1999; Frey and Stutzer, 2000). The index
is in line with the theoretical models, as it approximates quite precisely the costs of citizens
to use direct democratic instruments (for an alternative measure, see Appendix A6). Figure 5
shows the substantial variation in direct democracy across Swiss cantons, ranging from a value
of 1.75 (low direct democracy) in the canton of Geneva to 5.5 in the canton of Glarus. The
map also shows that direct democracy is more comprehensive in the German speaking part os
Switzerland.
For putting the findings into context, an important question is how direct democratic the
Swiss cantons are in comparative perspective. If we apply the calculation of the direct democracy
index to California, we calculate a rather low value of 2.33. However, the applied index is tailored
to the Swiss version of direct democracy, which biases this comparison. For example, California
is much more direct democratic in the sense that the government is neutral in the campaign,
political representatives have to implement successful initiatives, and citizens can ask for recall
elections. In the Swiss case, however, the governments and parliaments are quite heavily involved
in the initiative process: they can draft counterproposals, are active in campaigns, and finally, in
case of successful initiatives, they interact with the authors of the initiative for the elaboration
of implementation laws.
In sum, taking the comparison (and the caveats) into account, the variation in direct democ-
racy among Swiss cantons is very substantial and it spans from limited direct democracy to very
comprehensive participatory rights.
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
Figure 5: Direct Democracy Index Values for Swiss Cantons
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A6 Robustness Checks
As an alternative to the Stutzer (1999) index of direct democracy, we check the robustness of
the results with new data on direct democratic institutions in the Swiss cantons from Vatter
et al. (2010). The findings presented in Table A6 are robust.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Direct Democracy (alt.) 0.79∗∗ 0.51 −1.05
(0.37) (0.42) (0.76)
Government-Voter Preference Deviation −2.57∗∗ −10.34∗∗∗ −11.49∗∗∗
(1.00) (3.65) (3.86)
DD (alt.) x Preference Deviation 10.75∗∗ 13.35∗∗∗
(4.84) (5.07)
Voter Opinion Clarity 3.72∗∗
(1.55)
Government Opinion Clarity −2.32∗∗
(1.11)
GDP (per capita in 100k) 0.04
(0.59)
Electoral Threshold −0.01
(0.01)
% German speakers 1.22∗∗
(0.58)
Legislative Power 0.01
(1.12)
Population Size (in 100k) −0.02
(0.04)
SVP vote share −0.01
(0.02)
DD in Use (past 3 years) −0.27
(0.27)
Constant −0.50 0.14 −0.15 0.15
(0.31) (0.19) (0.32) (1.15)
BIC 360.59 359.21 359.12 392.25
`` -169.17 -168.48 -162.88 -154.42
N 260 260 260 260
Groups: Cantons 26 26 26 26
Groups: Policies 10 10 10 10
Variance: Canton 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.02
Variance: Policy 0.33 0.25 0.26 0.29
CPC: Correctly predicted cases; baseline is 51%.***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table A6: Robustness Check With Alternative Direct Democracy Measure.
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As an additional robustness check, we use an alternative measure of the citizen-government
preference deviation. In the main analysis, we set the government-voter preference gap equal to
0 when the government and voters share the same majority opinion. The alternative preference
deviation measure also differentiates between the sizes of the gaps in that case. Concretely, we
estimate the absolute difference of the preference gap and, when the the government and voters
hold opposing majority views, we add the value of 50 to the absolute deviation. With this
coding, we derive a gap variable that theoretically ranges between 0 and 150 and differentiates
between congruent (0 to 50) and incongruent (51 to 150) majority preferences. The smaller the
values of the variable, the closer are the positions of the government and voters. The presented
findings are robust.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Direct Democracy 0.19∗∗ 0.09 −0.19
(0.09) (0.11) (0.19)
Government-Voter Preference Deviation (alt.) −0.93∗∗∗ −3.65∗∗ −4.04∗∗
(0.36) (1.52) (1.58)
DD x Preference Deviation (alt.) 0.60∗ 0.73∗∗
(0.33) (0.34)
Voter Opinion Clarity 4.01∗∗
(1.57)
Government Opinion Clarity −2.55∗∗
(1.09)
GDP (ppc in 100k) 0.07
(0.60)
Electoral Threshold −0.01
(0.01)
% German speakers 0.99∗
(0.59)
Legislative Power 0.10
(1.13)
Population Size (in 100k) −0.01
(0.04)
SVP vote share −0.00
(0.02)
DD used (past 3 years) −0.26
(0.28)
Constant −0.81∗ 0.24 −0.12 0.31
(0.41) (0.21) (0.51) (1.31)
BIC 360.19 358.99 360.35 394.23
`` -168.97 -168.37 -163.49 -155.41
N 260 260 260 260
Groups: Cantons 26 26 26 26
Groups: Policies 10 10 10 10
Variance: Canton 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.03
Variance: Policy 0.33 0.26 0.27 0.33
CPC: Correctly predicted cases; baseline is 51%.***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table A6: Robustness Check With Alternative Preference Deviation Measure.
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A7 Policy Dimensionality Analysis
The finding that direct democracy is most effective when the elite-voter gap is largest raises
the question of when we would expect that gap to be large and thus direct democracy to be
an effective democratic corrective. While representation scholars emphasize that elections are
powerful for minimizing the elite-voter preference gap (Schumpeter, 1942; Mansbridge, 2009),
the advantage of direct democracy is that referendums and initiatives allow it to unbundle policy
issues (Kriesi, 2005; Besley and Coate, 2008).
The analysis of this study, the insights of the representation literature, and the unbundling
argument all suggest that the effectiveness of direct democracy on policy congruence depends
on the dimensionality of the political conflict structure. Accordingly, we should expect that
elections are powerful in democratically accommodating the main political conflict dimension
and that direct democratic institutions are particularly effective in aligning policies on second-
ordered dimensions with the majority will of the electorate. If that is correct, both the citizen-
elite preference gap and the effect of direct democracy on policy congruence should increase
as we move away from questions of the dominant (first) to other policy dimensions. The first
dimension usually covers classic left-right distributional questions, while the second dimensions
include cultural, identity, and residual issues (Kriesi et al., 2008; Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014).
In the following, we present an empirical policy dimensionality investigation. Before we
present the analysis, however, we would like to emphasize that our data does not allow us to
analyze the dimensionality of the political conflict structure for each canton separately. To
conduct the comparative analysis, we thus have to make simplifying assumptions based on the
findings of the literature. We assume that there are two dimensions plus a residual category.
Concretely, we code the questions on the tax rate, the progression, and the subsidies for health-
care as distinctive left-right distributional policies; we group all the three policies targeted at
foreigners in the second dimension category; and the remaining policies (education, family, and
health) form the a residual category.
Figure 6 and Table A7 show how the absolute preference gaps between the elite and the
citizens vary in the three categories and whether the effect of direct democracy varies across
the policy dimensions. The box plots of Figure 6 show that the elite-voter gap is smallest in
the policies of the first dimension. The estimates in Table A7 show a positive interaction effect
between the policy dimension variable and direct democracy, which suggests that the effect of
direct democracy is driven by policies not covered by the first dimension. The findings support
the argument that the effect of direct democracy depends on the dimensionality of the political
conflict structure.
However, we would like to emphasize that this analysis comes with limitations. Thus, the
findings should be interpreted carefully. Most importantly, we assume that the political conflict
structure is constant across cantons—despite the heterogeneity among the cantonal polities.
Some cantons are dominated by one or two parties, while we find in others a more fragmented
party system with many parties and consociational multiparty governments. Our data do not
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Policy Dimensions
G
ov
er
nm
en
t-C
iti
ze
n 
P
re
fe
re
nc
e 
G
ap
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
1 2 Residual
Figure 6: Preference Gap of Policy Dimensions
(1st Quartile, Mean, 3rd Quartile)
Model 1 Model 2
Direct Democracy 0.22∗∗ −0.23
(0.09) (0.21)
Gov.-Vot. Pref. Gap −2.95∗∗∗ −3.13∗∗∗
(0.98) (0.99)
Policy Dimension 0.32∗ −0.58
(0.18) (0.43)
DD x Policy Dim. 0.21∗∗
(0.09)
CONSTANT −1.42∗∗∗ 0.45
(0.55) (0.99)
BIC 360.52 361.18
`` -163.58 -161.13
N 260 260
Groups: Cantons 26 26
Groups: Policies 10 10
Variance: Canton 0.04 0.04
Variance: Policies 0.15 0.16
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table A7: The Direct Democracy Effect on Policy
Congruence Conditional on Policy Dimensions
allow us to make a fine-grained dimensionality analysis for each canton. In that sense, our
findings provide a broader macro picture on the question of how direct democracy interacts
with the political conflict structure in Swiss cantons. Given the limitations, the findings of the
dimensionality analysis are suggestive. More empirical research is needed to further disentangle
the link between political conflict structure, policy dimensionality, and the effectiveness of direct
democracy on policy congruence.
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